MBUS 873 — Session 5

US/China Rivalry Part II: Geopolitics of High Technology

Queen's Smith AMBA 2026 · Prof. David Detomasi · Participation-Ready Prep
Semiconductor Value Chain TSMC & the Silicon Shield CHIPS Act vs. Made in China 2025 Export Controls Taiwan, Semiconductors, and a "New Cold War"? (HBS 9-722-035)
Block 1 — The Lens: Technology as National Security

Why This Session Treats a Chip Factory Like an Oil Field

AMD founder Jerry Sanders opens the intellectual frame of this case in a single 1979 line, quoted on the case's cover page: "Semiconductor processing technology is today's crude oil.... The strength of all industrialized nations will largely depend on semiconductors by the end of this century." Session 4 treated critical minerals as a geopolitical lever because they sit at the base of every supply chain that matters. This session applies the identical logic one rung up the value chain: whoever controls the manufacturing chokepoint for a general-purpose technology — the chips inside every phone, missile, data center, and AI model — accumulates leverage disproportionate to that chokepoint's share of global GDP. Semiconductors generated $550 billion in global revenue in 2021, a rounding error next to the $100+ trillion world economy. But the case's entire argument is that dollar share understates strategic weight: a modern economy, a modern military, and a modern AI program simply do not function without leading-edge logic chips.

Strategic Leverage = f(Chokepoint Concentration), not f(Market Size)
A segment's geopolitical weight is set by how hard it is to route around — not by its share of industry revenue. That is why the front-end fabrication stage, not the whole $550B industry, is the fulcrum of this case.

The Semiconductor Value Chain: Four Segments, Four Different Geographies

The case (Exhibit 10) breaks the value chain into four segments, each with a different geography, capital intensity, and defensibility — which is exactly why the chain fractures so cleanly along geopolitical lines:

1

Pre-Competitive Research & EDA/Core IP

The software that designs chips and the foundational research behind them. Three US firms — Synopsys, Cadence, and Mentor — hold a combined 70% of the design-software market, making this a quiet American chokepoint.

Concentrated: United States
2

Chip Design (Fabless)

Firms like Nvidia, Qualcomm, AMD, and Apple design chips but own no factories — the "fabless" model TSMC's founding made viable. High value-add, low capital intensity, highly portable.

Concentrated: United States
3

Front-End Manufacturing (Foundry / Fab)

Fabricating the physical chip. A cutting-edge fab cost ~$20 billion and took two years to build as of 2020. By 2020, TSMC alone held 50% of global foundry capacity and the "lion's share" of leading-edge capacity — the case's central chokepoint.

Concentrated: Taiwan
4

Back-End Manufacturing (Assembly, Packaging, Testing)

Lower-value, more labor-intensive finishing steps. Historically the segment Taiwan itself entered via — dispersed across Taiwan, mainland China, and Southeast Asia; far easier to relocate than a fab.

Dispersed: Taiwan / China / SE Asia
The chokepoint is segment 3, not the industry. Design (segment 2) is portable — a fabless firm can headquarter anywhere with engineering talent. Back-end assembly (segment 4) is low-barrier and has already diffused across Asia. Front-end fabrication at the leading edge, by contrast, requires a single fab to cost $20 billion, take two years, and run at 99% yield across roughly 700 discrete process steps — a natural-monopoly economics that has concentrated almost the entire world's leading-edge output on one 13,826-square-mile island. That concentration, not the industry's dollar size, is why Taiwan sits "at the forefront of tectonic shifts in geopolitics and geoeconomics," in the case's own words.
$550B
Global semiconductor industry revenue, 2021
50%
TSMC's share of global foundry capacity, 2020
$20B / 2 yrs
Cost and build time for one leading-edge fab, as of 2020
12% → 14%
BCG's estimate of the US global production share shift from $50B in CHIPS subsidies

This is also the session's bridge from Session 4: critical minerals (rare earths, copper, cobalt) are the geological input; semiconductors are the manufactured chokepoint one step downstream, and China's own hand in that upstream layer — 35% of known rare-earth reserves, over 60% of production, and more than 85% of global refining capacity, per the case — means Beijing holds a countervailing lever even as it plays catch-up in chips themselves.

Block 2 — Async Video Lecture (Detomasi): "The Return of State Capitalism"
Source — Pre-Session Async Lecture

Prof. Detomasi's narrated 13-slide deck, about 29 minutes of audio. He bills it as "40 to 45 minutes," but the recording is shorter. This block is built from a transcript of the narration and the slide text, so the figures are the ones on his slides.

Unlike the Session 3 lecture, this one is current. Slide 11 cites Finance Canada as of 15 Sep 2026 and Canada Growth Fund figures "by August 2026," and he calls the Zambia copper discussion "last time" and "last week." That puts the recording in late September 2026, so you can quote its numbers as current.

How he frames the case. His opening line: "I'm going to take a look very specifically at how three separate countries have tried to develop a particular strength in semiconductor manufacturing and processing and design." That is Case Question 1, and the lecture supplies its lens. He wants the US, Taiwan and China read as three varieties of state capitalism, not as one market story and two state-led ones. He also spends three of his thirteen slides on Canada, so expect a "what should Canada do?" turn in the live discussion.

Part A — Why Rivals Watch Each Other's Industries: Relative Gains

He starts with competitiveness as a political question, not only an economic one. "Countries are concerned with what we call absolute versus relative gains. They measure themselves not only if they're absolutely better off, but whether or not they're better off in comparison to some other country that appears to be getting stronger." Alongside military capacity, the thing states watch most closely is a rival's ability to build strength "in the so-called industries of the future."

He dates this obsession in US policy writing back at least forty years: "When I began starting out in this field, the big obsession in the United States was concerns over Japan." The same fear now points at China, and the underlying complaint is the same: "it's more difficult to compete against a country that is practicing what we might call state capitalism, where state-owned companies, banks and society itself is all aligned around a few key measures."

The case already contains his Japan reference: SEMATECH (1987, half funded by DARPA) was the US response to the same 1980s Japan scare he describes. The class can therefore watch the US use state capitalism twice, against Japan in the 1980s and against China through the CHIPS Act. The useful question is what the first attempt teaches about the second. The case's own verdict on SEMATECH is that it worked as a consortium but missed the PC and microprocessor wave and mainly helped Intel. Intel is also the firm Washington now owns 9.9% of (Part F).
His aside on AI is worth repeating in class. On the recent Trump–Xi summit, he says the two leaders "seemed more bent on waging the contest" than on worrying about what AI might do to everyone: "the race to stay ahead can often become more important than the race to control an emerging technology that appears to have difficult implications for everyone." This leads straight into Session 7's Nvidia case. When rivalry is measured in relative gains, neither side can afford to slow down for safety.

Part B — What "State Capitalism" Means

His slide definition comes from the OECD's Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century (2024): government steers investment toward selected sectors or firms in pursuit of national goals, using tools that range from grants and tax credits to loans, procurement, price guarantees and equity. Private firms still make the commercial decisions. His narration adds three points.

  • It is the inward-facing half of geoeconomics. Earlier sessions covered the outward tools: trade and investment used "to either stop another country from doing something you don't want them to do or to induce them to do something you do want them to do." State capitalism uses the state's instruments at home to build capacity.
  • Two conditions justify it. (1) The sector is plausibly an industry of the future. (2) "Private sector capital itself and companies themselves either can't or won't funnel enough money into these industries" to keep a lead over rivals doing the same thing.
  • Both critics and defenders have a point. Critics call it "a way to spend money on pet projects that actually may or may not add much national security." But it is also "an admission that in some cases… free markets by themselves won't generate the types of results governments want."

He also links it to Session 3. Price guarantees showed up "even in aquaculture, where the US government essentially guaranteed price rates for fish." So the catfish case was a small instance of the same toolkit.

Part C — Three Varieties of Capitalism (Slide 4)

This is the slide to know cold, because it lets you map the three countries in the case. His framing question is how comfortable a country is with capitalism "red in tooth and claw": efficient outcomes that are sometimes socially troubling.

ModelHow It Works (His Description)Where He Places It
Finance capitalism Financial return drives economic decisions. Firms want independence from government help and "independence from government regulation, that is for sure." They hire, fire and invest as markets dictate, and CEOs and boards are judged and paid on returns. Business and government are often at odds. United States
Corporatism The state and firms are closely linked, out of concern about inequality caused by excessive capital accumulation. "The people who work for a company are just as important as the people who own its stock": Germany mandates labour seats on supervisory boards. Firms are financed through a central bank relationship rather than equity. The aim is stability and long-term planning. Western Europe, Japan, other East Asian economies
Statism State-driven development. The economy "may be nominally free market capitalist, but it still is driven very heavily by the goals of the country to maintain and increase its economic power, and consumer interest is often placed secondary." Singapore (Session 1), and "increasingly Canada"
Applying slide 4 to Case Question 1. The case's three countries map onto the three models, and each has moved since. Taiwan is classic statism at its origin: ITRI and ERSO, Hsinchu's government equity of up to 49%, and a premier personally recruiting Morris Chang. The firm it produced, however, runs on finance-capitalist discipline as a pure-play foundry answering to global customers and shareholders. That hybrid is arguably why it worked. China is statism at scale, with state funds, national champions and forced technology transfer, and the case shows the limits: capital without the learning curve gets to 5.9% domestic production against a 70% target. The United States is the finance-capitalist economy that has moved furthest toward statism, from CHIPS grants to taking an equity stake in Intel. The sharpest version of your Q1 answer is that the US is now copying the model it used to criticise, using tools its own system was built to avoid.

Part D — Statism Is the Historical Norm, Not the Exception (Slide 5)

His definition: statism is "the state's use of economic tools to enhance its own power and to weaken the power resources of others." Slide 5 lists five forms:

Build

Incentives and Strategic-Industry Aid

Incentives for domestic firms to develop key technologies, plus direct assistance to "strategic" industries. In the 1700s the strategic goods were silk or sugar; today they are critical minerals. "The idea remains the same."

Lock Up

Securing Others' Resources

Locking up other countries' economic resources through direct investment. "The clearest example was colonialism, 1500–1970." This is Session 4's Zambia case in its historical form.

Deny

Sanctions and Market Denial

Punishing states or shaping their behaviour through sanctions and asset freezes, and closing your market to their exports. The October 2022 chip controls belong here.

The mechanism he names is risk transfer. State instruments give firms the capacity "to go out and make investments you want them to make that they wouldn't have made otherwise because their shareholders wouldn't have let them." He then raises the political question every subsidy faces: why this industry? "Is it for geopolitical reasons, is it for electoral politics reasons, is it because it seems cool?" He concludes: "There's a lot of debate about the nature and extent of how effective this is. But there is no debate about how often people have tried to use it, which is very often."

Part E — Why It Came Back, and the Toolkit

Four Drivers (Slide 6)

1 · China's scale

China's near-monopoly on critical-mineral refining, and its use of that position to win concessions, showed that much of its strength came from state capitalism. Globalization "has strengthened potential adversaries and caused pain and suffering at home."

2 · COVID and Ukraine

These exposed dependencies "people weren't willing to look at before": Europe's reliance on Russian gas, and North America's thin capacity to make basic medical goods. His key line: "whether or not we could do it as cheaply as someone else was kind of irrelevant."

3 · Tech is now security

Semiconductors, AI, batteries and defence now tie economic capacity directly to national security.

4 · Climate

Western governments found it hard to compete with subsidised Chinese clean technology, and "the market alone probably wouldn't move fast enough or big enough."

The Toolkit: Read Headline Figures Carefully (Slide 7)

The third column on this slide is the most useful analytical tool in the lecture. It tells you what an announced dollar figure actually means.

InstrumentWhat Government ProvidesWhat the Headline Figure Means
EquityCash for shares or warrantsPublic ownership, with possible gain or loss. He notes it also gives the investment a government stamp of approval, which reassures other investors.
Grant / subsidyNon-repayable paymentThe maximum award may exceed the cash actually paid
Loan / guaranteeCredit or risk protectionFace value is not the cost of the subsidy
Tax creditReduced tax liability or refundCost depends on eligible activity. His Canadian example is the recent immediate write-off for major investments.
Procurement / offtakeA commitment to buyCreates demand, often over years. In agriculture this means guaranteed purchase and a price floor for food security.
Use this on the case's own numbers. The case cites the CHIPS and Science Act as "$278 billion" with "$52 billion+" for manufacturing. By his slide 7 logic, those are authorisations and award ceilings, not cash spent. His slide 10 shows up to US$33.7B across 20 awards by June 2025, and the TSMC Arizona grant listed as "up to" US$6.6B. The clearest example is Intel (Part F): US$5.7B of the government's US$8.9B equity stake came from CHIPS grants that had been awarded but not yet paid. A grant became an ownership stake. Pointing out that a "$52B" headline and the money actually paid are different things shows exactly the kind of evidence discipline he graded for in Session 3.

Part F — The United States: Build Capacity, and Deny It to Others

Slide 8 names four US priority sectors. His narration also explains that state capitalism works in two directions: the US acts "sometimes to build capacity, and sometimes to prevent that capacity from being built in others."

SectorFederal ActionStrategic Purpose / His Gloss
SemiconductorsCHIPS fabrication awards and R&DReduce concentration of advanced chip supply. It matters where chips are designed "but also, and perhaps more importantly, where they're actually fabricated." In a globalized world you assumed a foreign fab would always sell to you, but "today, that supply chain risk is too high."
Critical mineralsEquity, credit, offtake and price supportBuild domestic processing and magnets, so that firms "can make the investments profitably that they otherwise could not."
Batteries / autosDOE manufacturing loansAnchor plants and reshore manufacturing. Cheap energy matters here: "the cheaper the energy, the easier to manufacture."
Advanced technologyExport controls and screeningLimit access to sensitive capability. "If we spent a lot of money and time developing an advanced technology here… we're going to limit the amount of access foreigners have to it to ensure we get the full value."
This framing changes how to read export controls. On his account, the October 2022 controls are not a separate trade-policy tool. They are the denial side of the same industrial policy, a way of protecting the return on public R&D. That makes Block 6's bifurcation argument stronger: CHIPS subsidies and export controls are one policy, building at home and denying abroad, and that combination is what pushes the tech stack into two blocs.

Intel: The State as Shareholder (Slide 9)

US$8.9B
Agreed US government investment in Intel common stock (Aug 2025)
~9.9%
Share of Intel common stock the government receives
US$5.7B
Portion converted from CHIPS grants that had been awarded but not paid
Bipartisan
Support for Intel has continued across both administrations, "at least a decade now"

His summary on the slide: "The state shares the financial risk/reward, while seeking domestic chip manufacturing capacity." In the narration he explains why support for Intel crosses party lines: a domestic firm able to build leading-edge chips "is rare enough in the world today that it's something that commands bipartisan political attention."

Connect this to the case's history. Intel was the firm that kept its fabs when the rest of the industry went fabless ("real men have fabs"), and the case notes SEMATECH mainly helped Intel. Forty years and two industrial policies later, Washington is betting on Intel again, now as part owner. Morris Chang's view that US fabs face "cost problems, people problems, cultural problems" is the counterargument. An equity stake gives the state a share of Intel's upside. It does not give Intel TSMC's yields.

Scale With Conditions (Slide 10)

CaseAnnounced Federal SupportInstrument
CHIPS portfolioUp to US$33.7B across 20 awards by June 2025Direct funding awards
TSMC ArizonaUp to US$6.6B, within the CHIPS portfolio (Nov 2024)Grant award
StarPlus battery plantsUS$7.54B closed in Dec 2024DOE loan, including capitalised interest

Note the TSMC line: the US is paying Taiwan's champion to build in Arizona. That is a direct subsidy for gradually weakening the silicon shield (Block 5).

Part G — Canada: A Smaller Market Has to Choose Fewer Bets

"We have a lot less resources than does the United States. And because of that, we have to be more focused on where and how we make these investments." Over the past decade Canada's main bet has been EV batteries.

C$52.5B
PBO estimate of announced EV supply-chain support (2024)
C$31.4B / C$21.1B
Federal / provincial split of that total
C$6B+
Canada Growth Fund commitments, across 27 transactions, by Aug 2026
New
Sovereign wealth fund, pension capital for "nation building," Major Projects Office

He closes the Canada section with the two questions he is likely to ask in class: (a) which industries get public support, and (b) is it the right amount, scale, type and size for the industry to succeed where it otherwise would not?

US vs. Canada Summary (Slide 12)

QuestionUnited StatesCanada
Where is support largest?Semiconductors; strategic energy and manufacturing creditBattery production; critical minerals
Does government own firms?Yes: minority stake in IntelYes: Canada Growth Fund equity in selected firms
What limits results?Execution, fiscal exposure, technology shiftsProject delays, small market, competition with US incentives. In his words, "our regulatory system is very slow."
China's roleExplicit in chip controls and mineral securityStrong in minerals; other goals also drive EV policy
Canada's position, and a point to make in class. Canada is subsidising against the US as much as against China. Every battery plant it attracts is competing with US incentives on the same continent. Taiwan built one champion by concentrating; Canada has spread C$52.5B across a sector where it has no leading-edge firm. If Taiwan's lesson is "narrow and patient" (Block 4), the question for Canada is whether batteries were the right single bet, or whether critical-mineral processing, where Canada has a real geological advantage, would have been the more Taiwan-like choice.

Part H — Where to Read More, and His Closing Point

Slide 13's list of "geoeconomic endowments" comes from Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft: the ability to control outbound investment; domestic market features that build competitiveness; influence over commodity and energy flows; centrality to the global financial system; and the state's ability to "fashion" economic outcomes. The other books he shows:

  • Joshua Kurlantzick, State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism Is Transforming the World
  • William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control
  • Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order
  • Edward Alden and Rebecca Strauss, How America Stacks Up (CFR)
  • Aspen Strategy Group, Technology and National Security: Maintaining America's Edge (intro by Nye, Rice and Burns)
"It's not as if we've stopped international trade and investment… but people are doing much more of it with an eye to control, manage, build national development than they probably did 15 years ago."
His closing line, and a direct endorsement of Block 6's position on Case Question 3: trade is being securitised and split into blocs, not ending.
Block 3 — Case Analysis: Taiwan, Semiconductors, and a "New Cold War"? (HBS 9-722-035)
Case Summary

The case is built around one man's improbable bet and one company's improbable dominance. Morris Chang left a 25-year career at Texas Instruments in 1983 feeling "put out to pasture," only to be summoned back to Taiwan in 1985 by ROC Premier Sun Yun-suan to run the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). Chang's insight was structural: fab costs were doubling roughly every five years, reaching $250 million by 1985, while a small cohort of "fabless" design firms was emerging with no capacity of its own. In 1987 he spun ITRI's Electronics Research and Service Organization into a "pure-play" foundry — Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) — that would manufacture chips designed by others rather than compete in design or marketing. Over the next three decades TSMC became the world's most advanced semiconductor manufacturer, contradicting AMD CEO Jerry Sanders's 1992 boast that "real men have fabs" so thoroughly that AMD itself divested its foundries in 2009. By 2020, TSMC held 50% of global foundry capacity and effectively the entire market for the most advanced process nodes.

That concentration is now a geopolitical fact both superpowers are racing to undo. Washington's 2022 CHIPS and Science Act authorized $278 billion in federal funding, more than $52 billion of it for domestic semiconductor manufacturing; Beijing's National IC Plan (2014) and Made in China 2025 initiative set a target of 70% semiconductor self-sufficiency within a decade, backed by a $150 billion state-investment target — forty times China's previous investment in the industry. Yet as of the case's writing, Chinese-owned firms still produced only 5.9% of all semiconductors used in China, and Exhibit 14's count of firms worldwide capable of manufacturing below 10 nanometers shows almost none headquartered in China. Both superpowers, in other words, are spending unprecedented sums to reduce their dependence on an island neither fully controls — and that effort is precisely what has made Taiwan's semiconductor industry a live strategic asset rather than a purely commercial one.

That asset has a name in the case: the "silicon shield" — the idea, voiced by President Tsai Ing-wen and TSMC chairman Mark Liu alike, that Taiwan's centrality to the global chip supply makes an invasion too costly for China, and for the world, to tolerate. Liu told 60 Minutes that "the world all needs Taiwan's high-tech industry" and "will not let war happen in this region." The case opens in autumn 2021 with Chinese warplane incursions at record levels and Taiwan's defense minister warning China could mount an invasion "at the lowest possible cost" by 2025, and closes in winter 2024 with newly elected President Lai Ching-te repeating the shield's logic on the world stage. The case's central, unresolved tension is whether that shield still holds — or whether the very policies (CHIPS, Made in China 2025) both powers are pursuing to reduce their Taiwan dependence are quietly dismantling the deterrent they claim to fear losing.

Why This Case Belongs in Sessions 4–5

Session 4's Zambia case showed a smaller, weaker state navigating great-power competition over a resource it could not fully control. Taiwan is the same structural position at a vastly higher level of stakes: a 23.5-million-person democracy whose formal statehood is contested by its largest trading partner, sitting on top of the single most consequential manufacturing chokepoint in the modern economy. Where Zambia had copper and cobalt as bargaining chips, Taiwan has TSMC — and where Zambia's leverage was largely passive (its minerals are in the ground regardless of policy), Taiwan's leverage is the product of forty years of deliberate, state-orchestrated industrial policy that this session asks you to evaluate directly.

Block 4 — Government Policy Effects: US, Taiwan, China (Case Question 1)

Three States, Three Industrial-Policy Models, Three Very Different Results

The case is, among other things, a natural experiment in industrial policy — the same technology, pursued by three governments with radically different tools, time horizons, and starting conditions.

United States

Defense-Seeded, Then Reactive

  • The industry itself is a Pentagon creation: military demand funded transistor R&D at Bell Labs and financed Fairchild Semiconductor's founding (three days before Sputnik). A DOJ antitrust consent decree forced AT&T to license its patents openly, seeding a uniquely dynamic, IP-diffusing ecosystem.
  • 1980s Japan competition: SEMATECH consortium (1987), $200M/year, half DARPA-funded — GAO called it a success; critics said it missed the PC/microprocessor wave entirely and mainly helped Intel.
  • CHIPS Act (2022): $278B total, $52B+ for manufacturing, 25% investment tax credit; conditions include no stock buybacks and no new advanced-node investment in China.
  • Morris Chang called it an "expensive exercise in futility," citing TSMC's own failed 1990s US fab attempts — "cost problems," "people problems," "cultural problems." TSMC's Arizona build cost ~4x the Taiwan equivalent.
Verdict: highly effective at seeding the original industry (1950s–80s); much weaker as a reshoring tool today — capital cannot manufacture Taiwan's engineering culture or build-out speed on a subsidy timeline.
Taiwan

Patient, Coordinated, Decisive

  • Land reform (tenancy 64%→10%, 1949–73) freed capital and labor into export-oriented industrialization; the world's first export processing zone opened in 1966.
  • Manpower Development Plan pushed vocational enrollment from 40% to 60% (1965–75); by 1990, 30% of university students studied engineering (vs. 5% in India, 20% in South Korea).
  • ITRI (1973) and ERSO (1974) transferred a seven-micron process from RCA and trained 40 engineers; ERSO spun off UMC (1980) and then TSMC (1987) under Morris Chang's direct state mandate.
  • Hsinchu Science-Based Industry Park (1980), modeled on Silicon Valley, offered government equity stakes up to 49%, tax exemptions, and low-interest loans.
Verdict: the clear success case — decades of concentrated, patient state-industry coordination built one purpose-designed firm rather than diffusing capital broadly, and that firm now holds 50% of global foundry capacity.
China

Massive Capital, Partial Results

  • Three prior decades of state-owned semiconductor investment (1980s–2000s) produced facilities so dependent on foreign tech and talent that domestic spillovers were "all but nonexistent," per the case.
  • National IC Plan (2014) targeted $150B — 40x prior investment — funding national champion SMIC; Made in China 2025 (2015) set a 70% self-sufficiency target within a decade.
  • Tools included forced joint-venture technology transfer (25 firms surveyed), aggressive outbound M&A ($35B in 2015 alone, until Western CFIUS-style screening began blocking deals like Aixtron in 2016), and outright IP theft (SMIC's founder recruited 100+ former TSMC staff; TSMC sued and won 9% of SMIC plus $325M).
  • SMIC hit a 7-nanometer breakthrough in 2020 without EUV lithography — enough to power Huawei's 2023 Mate 60 — but analysts call it "years behind" TSMC, Intel, and Samsung.
Verdict: mixed — real, faster-than-expected progress at the margins, but Chinese-owned firms still produce only 5.9% of semiconductors used domestically versus a 70% target, proving capital alone cannot compress a multi-decade manufacturing learning curve.
The pattern across all three: the policy that worked best (Taiwan's) was the narrowest and most patient — one government, one small set of state-linked institutions (ITRI/ERSO/Hsinchu), one firm built over 15 years before it dominated anything. The policies struggling hardest (the US's reshoring push, China's self-sufficiency drive) are both trying to compress that multi-decade build-out into a single presidential term or five-year plan, using capital as a substitute for time. The case's own data (BCG: $50B only moves US share from 12% to 14%; China at 5.9% domestic production against a 70% target) suggests that substitution does not work cleanly.
Block 5 — The Silicon Shield: Protection or Vulnerability? (Case Question 2)

Does TSMC Protect Taiwan, or Paint a Target on It?

The case frames this as its central open question, and it deserves to be argued both ways before landing on a position.

The Case for Protection

  • TSMC chairman Mark Liu, on 60 Minutes: "the world all needs Taiwan's high-tech industry" and will therefore "not let war happen in this region" — mutual economic dependence as deterrent.
  • President Lai Ching-te, on winning the 2024 election: "the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is a common asset of the world... we hope China and the international community will cherish this industry as well."
  • An invasion would destroy the very asset China would be fighting over, and would trigger catastrophic, self-inflicted damage to China's own tech-dependent economy — raising the cost of conflict for Beijing specifically, not just for outside powers.
  • The shield gives the US, EU, Japan, and South Korea an economic — not just values-based — reason to back Taiwan's defense, widening the coalition that would respond to an invasion.

The Case for Vulnerability

  • Taiwan's defense minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, warned in 2021 that China would be able to invade "while keeping the cost and losses to the lowest possible level" by 2025.
  • China maintains a life-size replica of Taiwan's Presidential Office in Inner Mongolia to drill for a "decapitation strike," and the Global Times reported 2019 civilian-ship transport drills explicitly linked to "a potential landing mission... on the island of Taiwan."
  • Xi Jinping, 2019: reunification "should not be passed down from one generation to the next," and while he invoked "peaceful reunification" 18 times in one speech, he also stated "we do not renounce the use of force."
  • Pentagon wargames simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan have the "red team" (China) regularly beating the "blue team" (the US) — the shield's deterrent value depends on a political response speed the case gives no evidence will actually materialize.
  • Taiwan's own defense posture is underweighted for the threat: conscription fell to just four months by 2021 ("strawberry soldiers"), only ~80% of budgeted military positions were filled, and procurement still favors prestige platforms (66 F-16s for $8.1B in 2020) over the "porcupine strategy" of asymmetric anti-ship and anti-tank defenses some analysts recommend.
  • Crucially: the shield's very existence is what's driving Washington and Beijing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars building around Taiwan — which shrinks the shield's own deterrent value over time.

My Position: Real Protection Today, With a Shrinking Half-Life

The silicon shield is not a myth — TSMC's centrality genuinely raises the cost of conflict for China, for the US, and for every economy dependent on advanced chips, and that cost is real leverage Taiwan should not surrender lightly. But the shield's logic contains the seed of its own erosion: because Taiwan's concentration is precisely what threatens both superpowers, both are now rationally investing to reduce their exposure to it. Every CHIPS-funded fab in Arizona and Ohio, every additional percentage point SMIC claws toward self-sufficiency, is a small withdrawal from the account the shield draws on. The shield does not disappear overnight — Exhibit 14's chipmaker count shows the leading edge will remain Taiwan-and-Korea-concentrated for years — but its deterrent value is a depreciating asset, not a permanent guarantee.

Recommended navigation strategy for Taiwan: a dual-track approach. First, do not accelerate offshoring the leading edge — keeping TSMC's most advanced nodes physically on the island preserves what remains of the shield's deterrent value, and Morris Chang's own skepticism about US fab execution suggests the leading edge will stay Taiwan-anchored regardless for the medium term. Second, treat the shield as a asset to be spent down deliberately rather than relied upon passively: use TSMC's continued centrality now to lock in deeper defense commitments, embed Taiwan further into allied coordination mechanisms like the Chip 4 forum, and fund the "porcupine strategy" asymmetric defenses that would matter regardless of whether the shield holds. Taiwan's best strategy treats the shield as a clock, not a wall.
Block 6 — Deglobalization Implications (Case Question 3)

My Position: Yes, But It's Bifurcation in Tech, Not a General Retreat From Trade

The case gives Morris Chang — the architect of the most globalized, most specialized supply chain in existence — the closing word on this question, and it is a stark one: "globalization is almost dead and free trade is almost dead." I largely agree, with one important qualifier: what the evidence supports is not deglobalization across the whole economy, but a deliberate bifurcation of the technology stack specifically, into US-aligned and China-aligned blocs.

Evidence for Bifurcation

  • Legislated decoupling: CHIPS Act recipients are contractually barred from expanding advanced-node capacity in China — an industrial subsidy with an explicit decoupling clause attached.
  • Export controls with extraterritorial reach: the Biden administration's October 2022 controls blocked Chinese access to advanced semiconductors, manufacturing equipment, and even the intellectual property behind them, extended via the Foreign Direct Product Rule to reach a Dutch firm's (ASML's) EUV lithography machines. One industry analyst called the package "a declaration of full-scale technological economic cold war."
  • Allied bloc formation: the Netherlands and Japan joined US export controls in January 2023; the "Chip 4" forum (US, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan) formalizes coordination among a "trusted" manufacturing bloc.
  • China's mirror-image response: Made in China 2025's self-sufficiency drive plus China's own leverage over rare earths (35% of reserves, 60%+ of production, 85%+ of refining capacity) — both sides are building redundant, parallel capability rather than deepening the single integrated network.

The Counterargument — and Why It Doesn't Fully Hold

The case also supplies real evidence that chokepoint controls leak. Despite the 2022 controls, Chinese imports of semiconductors and manufacturing equipment reached near-record levels in 2023; Nvidia simply redesigned its most advanced chips to fall just below the regulatory threshold; and the Russia precedent is instructive — Russian semiconductor imports fell more than 50% in the first half of 2022 after sanctions, only to rebound and exceed 2021 levels by year-end, mostly rerouted through China and Hong Kong. BCG's own estimate that $50 billion in CHIPS subsidies shifts US global production share only from 12% to 14% suggests the "reshoring" story is more a hedging exercise than a genuine unwind of the existing network. I take this seriously — full deglobalization (a total severing of the US-China tech relationship) looks unlikely — but partial, deliberate bifurcation at the leading edge is already happening and accelerating, even if trade in mature-node chips and everything else continues largely as before.

Consequences of Bifurcation

Cost

Duplicative Capital

Every additional geography building a $20B, two-year fab raises the industry's cost base without adding net global capacity — TSMC's Arizona build alone cost roughly 4x the Taiwan equivalent.

Redundancy

Resilience Over Efficiency

"Trusted" supply chains (Chip 4) sacrifice the specialization gains of letting Taiwan do what it does best, cheaper, for everyone — trading efficiency for redundancy on both sides of the split.

Innovation Diffusion

Slower on Both Sides

Cutting China off from EUV and design software slows its innovation curve (SMIC remains "years behind" without EUV) — but US firms also lose a China market that historically supplied 20–30% of their revenue, a mutual drag on R&D funding.

The overlooked consequence: bifurcation doesn't just reshape US-China trade — it forces every third country to choose a compute stack it had no hand in designing. This is the thread I pick up directly in Block 8's Taju's Edge — a bifurcated tech world lands hardest on emerging-market builders who depend on affordable, undifferentiated global chip and cloud access, and who now face a choice that is increasingly not theirs to make.
Block 7 — Official Case Discussion Questions
Q1. Assess the effects of government policies on the development of the semiconductor industry in the United States, Taiwan, and China.
Three varieties of state capitalism (Block 2's lens: finance capitalism, corporatism, statism), three very different results. The US industry was defense-seeded (Bell Labs, Pentagon-funded transistor R&D, the Fairchild founding tied to Sputnik-era defense spending) and grew inside an open-IP ecosystem forced by AT&T's antitrust consent decree — genuinely effective in the 1950s–80s, but the 2022 CHIPS Act's $278B is proving a much weaker reshoring tool: BCG estimates it moves US global production share only from 12% to 14%, and Morris Chang calls it "an expensive exercise in futility" given TSMC's own failed 1990s US fab attempts. Taiwan's model — patient, narrow, state-coordinated (ITRI, ERSO, Hsinchu Park, Morris Chang's direct 1985 mandate) — is the clear success, producing a firm that now holds 50% of global foundry capacity. China's National IC Plan and Made in China 2025 mobilized unprecedented capital ($150B target, 40x prior investment) and produced real but partial results — SMIC's 2020 7nm breakthrough powered Huawei's 2023 Mate 60, but Chinese-owned firms still produce only 5.9% of domestic semiconductor consumption against a 70% self-sufficiency target. See Block 4 for the full comparison.
Q2. How should Taiwan navigate the rise of Sino-American tensions? Is its semiconductor industry a source of protection or vulnerability?
Both, and the balance is shifting. TSMC's centrality is real protection today — Mark Liu's and Lai Ching-te's "silicon shield" logic genuinely raises the cost of conflict for China and widens the coalition (US, EU, Japan, Korea) with an economic stake in Taiwan's defense. But it is simultaneously the single highest-value target in the rivalry, and the very policies both superpowers are pursuing to reduce Taiwan-dependence (CHIPS Act, Made in China 2025) are structurally eroding the shield's own deterrent value over time — a self-defeating dynamic the case never resolves. My recommendation: Taiwan should not accelerate offshoring its leading-edge capacity (that would remove the remaining deterrent for no defensive gain), while treating the shield as a depreciating asset to be spent deliberately now — deepening allied coordination (Chip 4), locking in defense commitments, and funding "porcupine strategy" asymmetric defenses rather than relying on the shield as a permanent guarantee. See Block 5 for the full argument.
Q3. Does the competition over Taiwan and the global semiconductor industry augur a world of deglobalization? If so, what likely consequences might deglobalization bring?
Yes, but as targeted bifurcation of the technology stack rather than a general retreat from global trade — Morris Chang's own "globalization is almost dead" verdict, backed by CHIPS Act decoupling clauses, extraterritorial export controls, and allied bloc formation (Chip 4, the Netherlands and Japan joining US controls). The counter-evidence — near-record 2023 Chinese chip imports, Nvidia's threshold-skirting redesigns, the Russia sanctions-evasion precedent — shows controls leak and full severance is unlikely, but partial, accelerating bifurcation at the leading edge is already underway. Consequences: duplicative capital costs (TSMC's Arizona fab at ~4x Taiwan's cost), resilience purchased at the expense of specialization efficiency, and slower innovation diffusion on both sides of the split. The consequence most often missed: a bifurcated tech world forces every other economy to choose a compute stack it did not build — hitting emerging-market technology builders hardest. See Block 6 for the full argument.
Block 8 — Participation Hooks

Consensus Point

The class will quickly agree that TSMC's dominance is real, structurally hard to replicate on a subsidy timeline, and now central to both US and Chinese strategy. Don't spend airtime re-litigating that — the more interesting question is what each side does about it, not whether it's true.

Provocative Push

Challenge the room: is the silicon shield's own logic self-defeating? If Taiwan's centrality is the reason Washington and Beijing are spending hundreds of billions of dollars building around it, then talking up the shield as leverage may be accelerating its own expiration — every dollar of CHIPS or Made in China 2025 spending is a small bet against the shield's premise. The shield may be most valuable in the years right now, while it's being actively dismantled by the powers who fear it most.

Taju's Edge — Supply Chain Concentration as a Product Risk

Think like a product operator, not a political scientist: TSMC's foundry model is a single point of failure the entire global tech industry rationally chose to accept for thirty years, because splitting fabless design (Nvidia, Apple, Qualcomm) from foundry (TSMC) let every fabless firm skip $20B capex and two-year build cycles. That's the same chokepoint economics I see one layer up in AI infrastructure today — nearly every AI product, including work I've done in African tech and edtech, ultimately depends on a small number of GPU and cloud chokepoints. The concentration that makes the industry efficient is exactly what makes it fragile precisely when geopolitics compounds it.

Taju's Edge — What Bifurcation Means for Emerging-Market Builders

If the tech world splits into a US-aligned and a China-aligned compute stack, African and other emerging-market tech companies don't get to build a third stack — they inherit whichever bloc's chips, cloud, and AI models are cheapest and most accessible in their market, and increasingly that choice is not theirs to make. This is directly relevant to how affordable-compute-dependent African products source infrastructure, and it will only get more consequential as export controls expand from semiconductors into AI model access itself — a preview of Session 7's Nvidia case.

Lecture Callback — Same Toolkit, Different Varieties

Open Q1 with Detomasi's slide 4 instead of a chronology: Taiwan was statist at its origin but produced a firm run on market discipline; China is statism at scale without the learning curve; the US is the finance-capitalist system that now holds 9.9% of Intel. The question is not "state or market" — all three used the state — but which variety converted public money into capability, and why the narrowest one won.

Provocative Push — Headline Figures and Canada

When someone quotes "$52 billion" or "$278 billion," use his slide 7: a grant figure is a ceiling, a loan's face value is not its subsidy cost, and US$5.7B of Intel's "new" US$8.9B equity was unpaid CHIPS grants re-labelled. Then pivot to his Canada question: if Taiwan's lesson is "one narrow, patient bet," was spreading C$52.5B across EV batteries — a sector where Canada has no leading-edge firm — the right bet, or should it have been critical-minerals processing?

Block 9 — Where This Connects in the Course
Session 1 — Singapore

Singapore's pivot toward biomedical sciences and a "Global-Asia" tech hub (Biopolis, A*STAR) is a smaller-scale version of the same state-directed tech-industrial playbook that built TSMC — a resource-poor state manufacturing competitiveness in a strategic technology sector through deliberate, patient institution-building rather than market forces alone.

Session 4 — Zambia / Critical Minerals

Zambia's copper and cobalt sit one layer further upstream in the exact same supply chain this case sits atop — the rare earths, copper, and critical minerals debate is the raw-material precursor to the chip fabrication chokepoint this session examines, and China's leverage in both layers (mineral supply and, increasingly, mature-node chips) is not a coincidence.

Session 7 — Nvidia

This session's export-control theme continues directly into Session 7's Nvidia case — the same October 2022 controls that cut Chinese AI firms off from Nvidia GPUs (95% of China's AI chip market) become the central strategic dilemma when examined from a single company's perspective rather than a national-policy one.